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Abstract
In this paper, we introduce and analyze new envy-based fairness con-
cepts for agents with weights: these weights regulate their mutual envy
in a situation where indivisible goods are allocated to the agents. We
propose two variants of envy-freeness up to one item for the weighted set-
ting: in the strong variant, the envy can be eliminated by removing an
item from the envied agent’s bundle, whereas in the weak variant, envy
can be eliminated by either removing an item from the envied agent’s
bundle or by replicating an item from the envied agent’s bundle in the
envying agent’s bundle. We prove that for additive valuations, a strongly
weighted envy-free allocation up to one item always exists and can be ef-
ficiently computed by means of a weight-based picking sequence. For two
agents, we can also efficiently achieve strong weighted envy-freeness up to
one item in conjunction with Pareto optimality using a weighted version
of the classic adjusted winner algorithm. In addition, we show that an al-
location that maximizes the weighted Nash social welfare always satisfies
weak weighted envy-freeness up to one item, but may fail to satisfy the
strong version of this property.
1 Introduction
The fair allocation of scarce resources to interested parties is a central issue
in economics. A fundamental fairness criterion is envy-freeness, which requires
that all agents find their assigned bundle to be the best among all assigned
bundles. We address the problem of allocating indivisible goods to agents in an
(approximately) envy-free manner when the agents have fixed, positive weights
that determine their entitlement of the goods.
There are several ways to interpret these weights and associated envy con-
cepts, depending on the problem domain. In some situations, the weights may
represent some publicly known and accepted measure of entitlement such as el-
igibility or merit ; weighted envy-freeness then stipulates that agents think that
the welfare they achieve from their bundle (to the welfare they achieve from
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another’s bundle) corresponds to the ratio of their respective eligibility scores.
Another possible interpretation is that a weight specifies the objective cost of
participation in the resource allocation “game”—no player should find that a
strictly higher bang per buck than her own could be obtained by investing or
paying as much as any other agent. Alternatively, Benabbou et al. [2018] (and
subsequent work by Benabbou et al. [2019]) study a model where agents rep-
resent groups of members/individuals; each member has her own utilities for
the items, and the group valuation can be computed from the utilities of its
members. In such settings, the size of a group can be considered as its weight;
thus, group i has weighted envy towards group j if and only if the average value
members of group i derive from their bundle is less than the value held by j
according to i’s valuation function, averaged over the members of j; in other
words, members of group i believe that, according to their own subjective util-
ities, agents in group j are, on average, better off than they are. In the setting
studied by Benabbou et al. [2018], groups correspond to ethnic groups (namely,
the major ethnic groups in Singapore); maintaining provable fairness guarantees
amongst the ethnic groups is highly desirable: it is one of the major tenants of
Singaporean society.
To conclude, the goal of this work is to extend notions of envy-freeness to the
weighted case, and explore their relationship to other important welfare notions,
such as Pareto optimality.
1.1 Our contributions
In Section 2, we propose two extensions of the popular fairness concept envy-
freeness up to one item (EF1) [Lipton et al., 2004, Budish, 2011] to the weighted
setting: (strong) weighted envy-freeness up to one item (WEF1) and weak weighted
envy-freeness up to one item (WWEF1). In addition to some negative results, we
show in Section 3 that a WEF1 allocation always exists and can be computed ef-
ficiently for additive valuation functions using a weight-based picking sequence
— this generalizes a well-known result from the unweighted setting. Moreover,
for two agents, we show that a weighted variant of the classic adjusted win-
ner protocol allows us to efficiently compute an allocation that is both WEF1
and Pareto optimal. In Section 4, we prove that an allocation with maximum
weighted Nash welfare is both Pareto optimal and WWEF1, thereby generalizing
an important result of Caragiannis et al. [2016]; we also show that such an allo-
cation may fail to satisfy WEF1. We conclude in Section 5 with some promising
directions on extensions of these ideas to settings with non-additive valuation
functions.
1.2 Related work
There is a vast literature on fair division of indivisible items; see, e.g., Bouveret et al.
[2016] for an overview. The majority of this literature assumes that the agents
are symmetric in that they have equal entitlements. Prior work on the fair al-
location of indivisible items to asymmetric agents has tackled fairness concepts
2
that are not based on envy. Farhadi et al. [2019] introduce and study weighted
maxmin share (WMMS) fairness, a generalization of an earlier fairness notion
of Budish [2011]. Aziz et al. [2019a] explore WMMS fairness in the allocation
of indivisible chores — items that, in contrast to goods, are valued negatively
by the agents — where agents’ weights can be interpreted as their shares of the
workload. Recently, Aziz et al. [2019b] propose a polynomial-time algorithm for
computing an allocation of a pool of goods and chores that satisfies both Pareto
optimality and weighted proportionality up to one item (PROP1) for agents
with asymmetric weights. Unequal entitlements have also been considered in
the context of divisible goods [Zeng, 2000, Cseh and Fleiner, 2018]. Unlike all
of these previous works, we focus on fairness concepts based on weighted envy
for the indivisible goods scenario.
2 Model and definitions
Throughout the paper, denote by [r] the set {1, 2, . . . , r} for any positive inte-
ger r. We are given a set N = [n] of agents, and a set O = {o1, . . . , om} of items
or goods. Subsets of O are referred to as bundles, and each agent i ∈ N has a
valuation function vi : 2
O → R≥0 over bundles; the valuation function for every
i ∈ N is normalized (i.e., vi(∅) = 0) and monotone (i.e., vi(S) ≤ vi(T ) whenever
S ⊆ T ). We will denote vi({o}) simply by vi(o) for any i ∈ N and o ∈ O.
An allocation A of the items to the agents is a collection of n disjoint bundles
A1, . . . , An such that
⋃
i∈N Ai ⊆ O; the bundle Ai is allocated to agent i and
vi(Ai) is agent i’s realized valuation under A. Given an allocation A, we denote
by A0 the set O\
(⋃
i∈N Ai
)
, and its elements are referred to as withheld items.
An allocation A is said to be complete if A0 = ∅ and incomplete otherwise.
In our asymmetric setting, each agent i ∈ N has a fixed weight wi > 0: these
weights regulate how agents value their own allocated bundles relative to those of
other agents, and hence bear on the overall (subjective) fairness of an allocation.
More precisely, we define the weighted envy of agent i towards agent j under
an allocation A as max
{
0,
vi(Aj)
wj
− vi(Ai)
wi
}
. An allocation is weighted envy-free
(WEF) if no agent has positive weighted envy towards another agent. Weighted
envy-freeness reduces to traditional envy-freeness when wi = w, ∀i ∈ N for some
positive real constant w. Since a complete envy-free allocation may not always
exist (see, e.g., [Bouveret et al., 2016]), it follows trivially that a complete WEF
allocation may not exist in general.
We now state the main definitions of our paper, which are extensions of
envy-freeness up to one item (EF1) [Lipton et al., 2004, Budish, 2011] to the
weighted setting.
Definition 2.1. An allocation A is said to be (strongly) weighted envy-free up
to one item (WEF1) if for any pair of agents i, j with vi(Ai)
wi
<
vi(Aj)
wj
, there exists
an item o ∈ Aj such that
vi(Ai)
wi
≥
vi(Aj\{o})
wj
.
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More generally, A is said to be weighted envy-free up to c items (WEFc) for an
integer c ≥ 1 if for any pair of agents i, j, there exists a subset Sc ⊆ Aj of size
at most c such that
vi(Ai)
wi
≥
vi(Aj\Sc)
wj
.
Definition 2.2. An allocation A is said to be weakly weighted envy-free up to
one item (WWEF1) if for any pair of agents i, j with vi(Ai)
wi
<
vi(Aj)
wj
, there exists
an item o ∈ Aj such that
either
vi(Ai)
wi
≥
vi(Aj\{o})
wj
or
vi(Ai ∪ {o})
wi
≥
vi(Aj)
wj
.
A valuation function v : 2O → R≥0 is said to be additive if v(S) =
∑
o∈S v(o)
for every S ⊆ O. If all agents have additive valuation functions, both WEF1 and
WWEF1 reduce to EF1 in the unweighted setting. Moreover, one can check that
under additive valuations, an allocation satisfies WWEF1 if and only if for any
pair of agents i, j with vi(Ai)
wi
<
vi(Aj)
wj
, there exists an item o ∈ Aj such that
vi(Ai)
wi
≥
vi(Aj)
wj
−
vi(o)
min{wi, wj}
.
In addition to fairness, we also often want our allocation to satisfy an ef-
ficiency criterion. One important such criterion is Pareto optimality. An al-
location A′ is said to Pareto dominate an allocation A if vi(A
′
i) ≥ vi(Ai) for
all agents i ∈ N and vj(A′j) > vj(Aj) for some agent j ∈ N . An allocation
is Pareto-optimal (or PO for short) if it is not Pareto dominated by any other
allocation.
A property of an allocation A that is known to have strong guarantees with
respect to both fairness and efficiency in the unweighted setting is the Nash
welfare, defined as NW(A) ,
∏
i∈N vi(Ai) [Caragiannis et al., 2016]. For our
weighted setting, we define a natural extension called weighted Nash welfare:
WNW(A) ,
∏
i∈N vi(Ai)
wi . Since it is possible that the maximum attainable
WNW(A) is 0, we define the maximum weighted Nash welfare or MWNW allocation
along the lines of Caragiannis et al. [2016] as follows: given a problem instance,
we find a maximal subset of agents, say Nmax ⊆ N , to which we can allocate
bundles of positive value, and compute an allocation to agents in Nmax that
maximizes
∏
i∈Nmax
vi(Ai)
wi .
To see why the notion of MWNW makes some intuitive sense, consider a setting
where agents have a value of 1 for each item they receive; furthermore, assume
that the number of items is exactly
∑n
i=1 wi. In this case, one can verify (using
standard calculus) that an allocation maximizing MWNW assigns agent i exactly
wi items. Indeed, following the interpretation of wi as the number of members
of group i, the expression vi(Ai)
wi can be thought of as each member of group
i deriving the same value from the set Ai; the group’s overall Nash welfare is
thus vi(Ai)
wi .
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2.1 Discussion of weak weighted envy
The criterion WEF1 can be criticized as being too demanding in certain circum-
stances, when the weight of the envied agent is much larger than that of the
envying agent. To illustrate this, consider a problem instance where agent 1
has an additive valuation function and is indifferent among all items taken in-
dividually, e.g., v1(o) = 1 for every o ∈ O. Now, if w1 = 1 and w2 = 100, then
eliminating one item from agent 2’s bundle reduces agent 1’s weighted valuation
of this bundle by merely 0.01. As such, we might trigger a substantial adverse
effect on the welfare/efficiency of the allocation by aiming to (approximately)
eliminate 1’s weighted envy towards 2. This line of thinking was our motivation
for introducing the weak weighted envy-freeness concept.
The WWEF1 property turns out to have the following interesting interpretation
for additive valuations. Let us call an agent with a higher (resp., lower) weight
a bigger (resp., smaller) agent. If wi ≥ wj , then the WWEF1 property for agents
i and j reduces to having vi(Ai)
wi
≥
vi(Aj)−vi(o)
wj
for some o ∈ Aj , which is
identical to the (strong) WEF1 condition — a bigger agent is weakly weighted
envy-free up to one item towards a smaller agent if the latter’s bundle has an
item which can be eliminated to make the bigger agent prefer (in terms of weight-
adjusted valuation) her own allocated bundle to the smaller agent’s reduced
bundle. If wi < wj , then the WWEF1 property requires
vi(Ai)
wi
≥ vi(Aj)
wj
− vi(o)
wi
,
i.e. vi(Ai)+vi(o)
wi
≥ vi(Aj)
wj
for some o ∈ Aj — a smaller agent is weakly weighted
envy-free up to one item towards a bigger agent if the latter’s bundle has an item
such that augmenting the smaller agent’s bundle with (a replica of) this item
makes her prefer (again, in a weight-adjusted manner) this augmented bundle
to the bigger agent’s original bundle.
Both of the above statements can be viewed as stronger versions along differ-
ent lines of what we can call transfer weighted envy-freeness : agent i is transfer
weighted envy-free up to one item towards agent j under the allocation A if there
is an item o ∈ Aj which would eliminate the weighted envy of i towards j upon
being transferred from Aj to Ai, i.e., vi(Ai ∪ {o}) ≥
wi
wj
· vi(Aj\{o}). The first
and second conditions in the previous paragraph relax transfer to elimination
from Aj only and replication in Ai only, respectively.
3 WEF1 allocations
Although it is known that for arbitrary monotone valuation functions, a com-
plete (unweighted) EF1 allocation always exists and can be efficiently computed
assuming polynomial-time oracle access to the valuation functions [Lipton et al.,
2004], this fact does not imply the existence of the more general complete WEF1
allocations for arbitrary weights and valuation functions.
As far as envy in the traditional sense is concerned, what an agent actually
“envies” is an allocated bundle regardless of who owns that bundle. However,
both the subjective valuations of allocated bundles and the relative weights
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interact in non-trivial ways to decide weighted envy. It is easy to see that
weighted envy of i towards j does not imply (traditional) envy of i towards j, and
vice versa. A crucial implication is that even if agent i’s bundle is replaced with
the bundle of an agent j towards whom i has weighted envy, i’s realized valuation
(and hence the ratio of its realized valuation to its weight) may decrease as a
result. Indeed, consider a problem instance with N = [2], O = {o1, o2, o3};
weights w1 = 3 and w2 = 1; and identical, additive valuation functions such that
vi(o) = 1, ∀i ∈ N , ∀o ∈ O. Under the complete allocation with A1 = {o1, o2},
agent 1 has weighted envy towards agent 2 since v1(A2)/w2 = 1/1 = 1 > 2/3 =
v1(A1)/w1, although agent 1 would not prefer to replace A1 with A2 since that
reduces her realized valuation from 2 to 1. On the other hand, agent 2 could
benefit from replacing A2 with A1 even though she does not have weighted
envy towards agent 1. As such, the natural extension of Lipton et al. [2004]’s
seminal envy cycle elimination algorithm does not guarantee a complete WEF1
allocation except in special cases. One such special case is when the agents all
have identical valuations.
Proposition 3.1. The weighted version of Lipton et al. [2004]’s envy cycle
elimination algorithm (where an edge exists from agent i to agent j if and only
if i has weighted envy towards j) produces a complete WEF1 allocation whenever
agents have identical valuations, i.e., vi(S) = v(S) for some v : 2
O → R≥0,
∀i ∈ N , ∀S ⊆ O.
Proof. From the construction of the algorithm [Lipton et al., 2004], it is evident
that the (partial) allocation at the end of each iteration is guaranteed to be
WEF1 as long as we can find an agent, say i, towards whom no other agent
has weighted envy at the beginning of the iteration: we give the item under
consideration to this agent i and thus any resulting weighted envy towards i
can be eliminated by removing this item. The only way we would not find
such an agent is if the weighted envy graph consisted of cycles only; we will
show that this cannot be the case. Suppose that agents 1, 2, . . . ,m form a
cycle (in that order) for some m ∈ [n]. Then, under identical valuations, we
must have v(A1)/w1 < v(A2)/w2 < · · · < v(Am)/wm < v(A1)/w1, which is a
contradiction. Hence, the weighted envy graph can never have cycles, ensuring
there is always an agent we can give an item to, while maintaining the WEF1
property.
Unfortunately, the positive results for utilizing Lipton et al. [2004] end in
Proposition 3.1.
Proposition 3.2. If agents do not have identical valuation functions, then the
weighted version of Lipton et al. [2004]’s envy cycle elimination algorithm may
not produce a complete WEF1 allocation, even in a problem instance with two
agents having additive valuations.
Proof. Consider a problem instance with N = [2] and m = 12; weights w1 = 1
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and w2 = 2; and valuation functions such that:
v1(or) =

1 for r = 1;
0.4 for r = 12;
0.21 otherwise;
and v2(or) =

1.1 for r = 1;
0.4 for r = 12;
0.2 otherwise.
Suppose that the weighted envy cycle elimination algorithm iterates over
o1, o2, . . . , o12, and starts by allocating o1 to agent 1 due to, say, lexicographic
tie-breaking. At this point, agent 2 has weighted envy towards agent 1 and not
vice versa; moreover, this condition persists until items o2, . . . , o10 have all been
allocated to agent 2. At this point, item o11 also goes to agent 2, resulting in
valuations v1(A1) = v1(o1) = 1 and v2(A2) = v2({o2, . . . , o11}) = 0.2× 10 = 2.
Agent 2 still has weighted envy towards agent 1 since v2(A2)/w2 = 2/2 =
1 < 1.1/1 = v2(A1)/w1; on the other hand, agent 1 also develops weighted
envy towards agent 2 since v1(A2)/w2 = (0.21×10)/2 = 1.05 > 1 = v1(A1)/w1.
Thus, there is a cycle in the induced envy graph. For an unweighted envy graph,
we would “de-cycle” the graph at this point by swapping bundles over the cycle
and that would still maintain the invariant that the allocation is EF1. However,
if we swap bundles in this example, agent 2 will end up having weighted envy
up to more than one item towards agent 1 since v2(A1)/w2 = 1.1/2 = 0.55 and
v2(A2\{o})/w1 = (0.2 × 9)/1 = 1.8 for every o ∈ A2.1 Interestingly, in this
example the allocation up to o11 is actually WEF1 without swapping. However,
the approach inspired by [Lipton et al., 2004] cannot even proceed to o12.
2
3.1 WEF1 and PO Allocations for Two Agents via the Ad-
justed Winner Protocol
We now show that for two agents with additive valuations, we can achieve both
WEF1 and PO by adapting the classic adjusted winner protocol to the weighted
setting. We first address instances where v1(o) > 0 and v2(o) > 0 for every
o ∈ O, and then comment on what happens otherwise.
Theorem 3.3. For two agents with additive valuations and arbitrary positive
real weights, a complete, WEF1 and PO allocation always exists, and can be com-
puted in polynomial time.
Proof. Assume first that both agents have positive value for all items. Our proof
is constructive: we claim that the Weighted Adjusted Winner algorithm as de-
lineated in Algorithm 1 produces an allocation satisfying the theorem statement.
First note that the left-hand side of the while loop condition is strictly
increasing in d and trivially exceeds the right-hand side for d = m− 1;3 hence,
there always exists a d ∈ [m− 1] which satisfies the stop criterion and the loop
terminates at the smallest such d.
1In fact, the weighted envy is up to eight items.
2Another interesting feature of this example is that the two agents have commensurable
valuations:
∑
o∈O
v1(o) =
∑
o∈O
v2(o) = 3.5.
3For d ≥ m− 1, we set the right-hand side to zero.
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Algorithm 1: Weighted Adjusted Winner
1 Assume: v1(o1)
v2(o1)
≥ v1(o2)
v2(o2)
≥ · · · ≥ v1(om)
v2(om)
w.l.o.g.
2 d← 1.
3 while 1
w1
∑d
r=1 v1(or) <
1
w2
∑m
r=d+2 v1(or) do
4 d← d+ 1.
5 end
6 A1 ← {o1, · · · , od}.
7 A2 ← {od+1, · · · , om}.
WEF1 property: If the while loop ends with d = d∗, let us denote od∗ by o
∗.
Then, by construction, v1(A1)
w1
≥
v1(A2)−v1(od∗+1)
w2
, which implies that agent 1 is
weighted envy-free towards agent 2 up to one item (specifically this item od∗+1).
On the other hand, by construction, we also get that
v1(A1)− v1(o∗)
w1
<
v1(A2)
w2
. (1)
Moreover, due to the ordering of the ratios, we have∑d∗
r=1 v1(or)∑d∗
r=1 v2(or)
≥
v1(o
∗)
v2(o∗)
≥
∑m
r=d∗+1 v1(or)∑m
r=d∗+1 v2(or)
⇒
v1(A1)
v2(A1)
≥
v1(o
∗)
v2(o∗)
≥
v1(A2)
v2(A2)
⇒ v1(A1) ≥
v1(o
∗)
v2(o∗)
· v2(A1);
v1(A2) ≤
v1(o
∗)
v2(o∗)
· v2(A2).
Combining with Inequality (1), dividing through by v1(o
∗)
v2(o∗)
, and simplifying, we
get
v2(A1)− v2(o∗)
w1
≤
v2(A2)
w2
.
Thus, agent 2 is also weighted envy-free towards agent 1 up to one item (specif-
ically o∗).
Pareto optimality: First note that no incomplete allocation can be Pareto
optimal since the realized valuation of either agent could be strictly improved
by augmenting its bundle with a withheld item (under our assumption that
each agent values each item positively). Since the allocation A produced by
Algorithm 1 is complete, it suffices to show that it cannot be Pareto dominated
by an alternative complete allocation A′. Any such complete allocation can be
thought of as being generated by transferring items between A1 and A2.
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Suppose that v1(A
′
1) > v1(A1) for an arbitrary complete allocation A
′ 6≡ A.
Since A1 ∪ A2 = A′1 ∪ A
′
2 = O, the above inequality implies that
v1(A
′
1 ∩ A1) + v1(A
′
1 ∩ A2) > v1(A
′
1 ∩ A1) + v1(A
′
2 ∩ A1)
⇒ v1(A
′
1 ∩ A2) > v1(A
′
2 ∩ A1). (2)
If A′2 ∩ A1 = ∅, then A
′
2 ⊂ A2 (since A
′
2 6= A2). Hence, v1(A
′
2) < v1(A2) so
that A′ cannot Pareto dominate A. As such, we will assume that A′2 ∩ A1 6= ∅.
Then, due to the ratio ordering and how A1, A2 are constructed,
v1(o)
v2(o)
≥
v1(o
∗)
v2(o∗)
∀o ∈ A′2 ∩ A1
⇒
v1(A
′
2 ∩ A1)
v2(A′2 ∩ A1)
=
∑
o∈A′
2
∩A1
v1(o)∑
o∈A′
2
∩A1
v2(o)
≥
v1(o
∗)
v2(o∗)
.
By similar reasoning,
v1(o
∗)
v2(o∗)
≥
v1(A
′
1 ∩ A2)
v2(A′1 ∩ A2)
.
Combining with Inequality 2, we get
v1(A
′
2 ∩ A1)
v2(A′2 ∩ A1)
≥
v1(A
′
1 ∩ A2)
v2(A′1 ∩ A2)
>
v1(A
′
2 ∩ A1)
v2(A′1 ∩ A2)
⇒ v2(A
′
1 ∩ A2) > v2(A
′
2 ∩ A1), since v1(A
′
2 ∩ A1) > 0,
⇒ v2(A
′
2 ∩ A2) + v2(A
′
1 ∩ A2) > v2(A
′
2 ∩ A2) + v2(A
′
2 ∩ A1)
⇒ v2(A2) > v2(A
′
2),
which contradicts the necessary condition forA′ to Pareto dominateA: v2(A
′
2) ≥
v2(A2). Assuming v2(A
′
2) > v2(A2) leads us to an analogous contradiction.
Hence, A must be Pareto optimal.
Complexity: The m ratios can be sorted in O(m logm) time. The while
loop condition can be checked in O(1) time, so the total time taken by the while
loop is O(m). Hence, the algorithm runs in O(m logm) time.
Let us now address the scenario where there are items that are of zero value
to an agent. Of course, items valued at zero by both agents can be safely
assumed away. We will initialize the bundle Ai with items valued positively by
agent i ∈ {1, 2} only, i.e., A01 = {o ∈ O : v1(o) > 0, v2(o) = 0} and A
0
2 = {o ∈
O : v2(o) > 0, v1(o) = 0}. Then we run Algorithm 1 on the remaining items and
use its output (A1, A2) to augment the respective bundles. We will now show
that the resulting allocation (A01 ∪ A1, A
0
2 ∪A2) is WEF1 and PO.
By the construction of the algorithm, there is an o′ ∈ A2 ⊆ A02 ∪ A2 such
that
v1(A
0
1 ∪ A1)
w1
≥
v1(A1)
w1
≥
v1(A2)− v1(o′)
w2
=
v1(A
0
2 ∪A2)− v1(o
′)
w2
,
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since valuations are additive and v1(A
0
2) = 0. Thus, agent 1 is weighted envy-free
towards agent 2 up to one item; the converse is also true by similar arguments.
Since a Pareto optimal allocation cannot be incomplete, it suffices to show
that the (complete) allocation under consideration is not Pareto dominated by
any complete allocation. Again, any complete allocation can be obtained from
(A01 ∪ A1, A
0
2 ∪ A2) by swapping items between agents. It is evident that any
allocation in which an item o ∈ A01 (resp., an item o ∈ A
0
2) belongs to agent 2
(resp., agent 1) is Pareto dominated by the allocation wherein this item is given
to agent 1 (resp., agent 2), everything else remaining the same. Hence, it suffices
to show that a Pareto improvement cannot be achieved by swapping items in
A1 ∪ A2 between the agents — but we already know this from the earlier part
of the proof.
3.2 Picking Sequence Protocols for WEF1 Allocations with
n ≥ 2 Agents
When all agents have equal weight, it is well-known that a round-robin algo-
rithm, wherein the agents take turns picking an item, produces an EF1 allocation
(see, e.g., Caragiannis et al. [2016]). We show next that in the general case we
can construct a weight-dependent picking sequence, which guarantees WEF1 for
any number of agents and arbitrary weights.
Theorem 3.4. For any number n ≥ 2 of agents with additive valuations and
arbitrary positive real weights, a complete WEF1 allocation always exists and can
be computed in polynomial time.
Algorithm 2: Pick the Least Weight-Adjusted Frequent Picker
1 Remaining items Ô ← O.
2 Bundles Ai ← ∅, ∀i ∈ N .
3 ti ← 0, ∀i ∈ N . /*number of times each agent has picked so far*/
4 while Ô 6= ∅ do
5 i∗ ← argmini∈N
ti
wi
, breaking ties lexicographically.
6 o∗ ← argmax
o∈Ô vi∗(o), breaking ties arbitrarily.
7 Ai∗ ← Ai∗ ∪ {o∗}.
8 Ô ← Ô\{o∗}.
9 ti∗ ← ti∗ + 1.
10 end
Proof. Our proof is constructive: we construct a picking sequence such that at
each turn, an agent with the lowest weight-adjusted picking frequency picks the
next item (Algorithm 2). We claim that after the allocation of each item, for
any agent i, every other agent is weighted envy-free towards i up to the item
that i picked first.
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To this end, first note that picking the agent who has had the minimum
(weight-adjusted) number of picks thus far ensures that the first n picks are
a round robin over the agents; in this phase, the allocation is obviously WEF1
since each agent has at most one item at any point. We will show that, after
this phase, the algorithm generates a picking sequence over the agents with the
following property:
Lemma 3.5. Consider an agent i chosen by Algorithm 2 to pick an item at
some iteration t, and suppose that this is not her first pick. Let ti and tj be the
numbers of times agent i and some other agent j appear in the prefix of iteration
t in the sequence respectively, not including iteration t itself. Then
tj
ti
≥ wj
wi
.
We will then show that this property is sufficient to ensure that the latest
picker does not attract weighted envy up to more than one item towards herself
after her latest pick:
Lemma 3.6. Suppose that, for every iteration in which agent i receives an item
after her first pick, the numbers of times that agent i and some other agent j
appear in the prefix of the iteration in the sequence—ti and tj respectively—
satisfy the relation
tj
ti
≥ wj
wi
. Then, in the partial allocation up to and including
i’s latest pick, agent j is weighted envy-free towards i up to the first item i
picked.
Obviously, after its latest picking, an agent’s envy towards others cannot get
any worse. Since the partial allocation after the initial, round-robin phase is
WEF1 and every agent is weighted envy-free up to one item towards every picker
due to Lemmas 3.5 and 3.6, the allocation is WEF1 at every iteration. Hence, for
the proof of correctness, it suffices to prove the two lemmas.
Proof of Lemma 3.5. Since agent i is picked at iteration t, it must be the case
that i ∈ argmink∈N
tk
wk
. This means that ti
wi
≤ tj
wj
, i.e.,
tj
ti
≥ wj
wi
since ti > 0.
Proof of Lemma 3.6. Let γ ,
wj
wi
. Consider any iteration t in which agent i is
chosen. Let agent j’s values for the items allocated to agent i in the latter’s
second, third, . . . , (ti+1)
st picks (the last one occurring at the iteration t under
consideration) be β1, β2, . . . , βti respectively. If o
∗ is the first item picked by
agent i and At the partial allocation up to and including iteration t, then clearly
vj(A
t
i\{o
∗}) =
∑ti
x=1 βx. Let the number of times agent j appears in the prefix
of agent i’s second pick be τ1; that between agent i’s second and third picks
be τ2; . . . ; that between agent i’s t
th
i and (ti + 1)
st picks be τti . Let agent j’s
values for the items she herself picked during phase x ∈ [ti] be αx1 , α
x
2 , . . . , α
x
τx
respectively. Then, vj(A
t
j) =
∑ti
x=1
∑τx
y=1 α
x
y . Now, since
∑r
x=1 τx and r are
the numbers of times agents j and i appear in the prefix of the latter’s (r+1)st
pick respectively, the condition of the lemma dictates that
r∑
x=1
τx ≥ rγ ∀r ∈ [ti]. (3)
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Note that τi ≥ γ > 0; but τx can be zero for some x ∈ {2, 3, . . . , ti} — this
corresponds to the scenario that agent i picked more than once successively.
Moreover, every time agent j was chosen, she picked one of the items she values
the most among those available, including the items picked by agent i later.
Hence, if τx > 0, then
αxy ≥ max{βx, βx+1, . . . , βti} ∀y ∈ [τx] ∀x ∈ [ti]
⇒
τx∑
y=1
αxy ≥ τxmax{βx, βx+1, . . . , βti}. (4)
Note that Inequality (4) holds trivially if τx = 0 since both sides are zero; hence
it holds for every x ∈ [ti].
We claim that for each r ∈ [ti],
r∑
x=1
τx∑
y=1
αxy ≥ γ
r∑
x=1
βx +
(
r∑
x=1
τx − rγ
)
max{βr, βr+1, . . . , βti}.
To prove the claim, we proceed by induction on r. For the base case r = 1, we
have τ1 > 0. Hence, from Inequality (4),
τ1∑
y=1
α1y ≥ τ1max{β1, β2, . . . , βti}
≥ γβ1 + (τ1 − γ)max{β1, β2, . . . , βti},
where we use τ1 − γ ≥ 0 due to Inequality (3). For the inductive step, assume
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that the claim holds for r − 1; we will prove it for r. If τr > 0, We have
r∑
x=1
τx∑
y=1
αxy =
r−1∑
x=1
τx∑
y=1
αxy +
τr∑
y=1
αry
≥ γ
r−1∑
x=1
βx +
(
r−1∑
x=1
τx − (r − 1)γ
)
max{βr−1, βr, . . . , βti}
+
τr∑
y=1
αry
≥ γ
r−1∑
x=1
βx +
(
r−1∑
x=1
τx − (r − 1)γ
)
max{βr−1, βr, . . . , βti}
+ τrmax{βr, βr+1, . . . , βti}
≥ γ
r−1∑
x=1
βx +
(
r−1∑
x=1
τx − (r − 1)γ
)
max{βr, βr+1, . . . , βti}
+ τrmax{βr, βr+1, . . . , βti}
= γ
r−1∑
x=1
βx +
(
r∑
x=1
τx − (r − 1)γ
)
max{βr, βr+1, . . . , βti}
= γ
r−1∑
x=1
βx + γmax{βr, βr+1, . . . , βti}
+
(
r∑
x=1
τx − rγ
)
max{βr, βr+1, . . . , βti}
≥ γ
r−1∑
x=1
βx + γβr +
(
r∑
x=1
τx − rγ
)
max{βr, βr+1, . . . , βti}
= γ
r∑
x=1
βx +
(
r∑
x=1
τx − rγ
)
max{βr, βr+1, . . . , βti},
where the first inequality follows directly from the inductive hypothesis, the
second from Inequality (4), and the third from Inequality (3) as well as the fact
that max{βr−1, βr, . . . , βti} ≥ max{βr, βr+1, . . . , βti}. This proves the claim.
Now, taking r = ti in the claim, we get
ti∑
x=1
τx∑
y=1
αxy ≥ γ
ti∑
x=1
βx +
(
ti∑
x=1
τx − tiγ
)
βti
≥ γ
ti∑
x=1
βx,
where we use Inequality (3) again for the second inequality. This implies that
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vj(A
t
j) ≥
wj
wi
·vj(Ati\{o
∗}), i.e., agent j is weighted envy-free towards agent i up
to one item, concluding the proof.
For the time-complexity, note that there are O(m) iterations of the while
loop. In each iteration, determining the next picker takes O(n) time, while
letting the picker pick her favorite item takes O(m) time. Since we may assume
that m > n (otherwise it suffices to allocate at most one item to every agent),
the algorithm runs in time O(m2).
If wi = w, a positive constant for every i ∈ N , then Algorithm 2 degenerates
into the traditional round-robin procedure which is guaranteed to return an EF1
allocation for additive valuations, but may not be PO; as such, Algorithm 2 may
not produce a PO allocation either. This is easily seen in the following example:
N = [2], O = {o1, o2}; w1 = w2 = 1; v1(o1) = 0.5, v1(o2) = 0.5, v2(o1) = 0.8,
v2(o2) = 0.2. With lexicographic tie-breaking for both agents and items, our
algorithm will give us A1 = o1 and A2 = o2, which is Pareto dominated by
A′1 = {o2} and A
′
2 = {o1}.
4 WWEF1 allocations
In this section, we show that the MWNW allocation satisfies WWEF1 and PO, thereby
generalizing Caragiannis et al. [2016]’s result from the unweighted setting. We
also show that for any constant c, this allocation may fail to be WEFc.
Theorem 4.1. For any number n of agents with additive valuations and ar-
bitrary positive real weights, the MWNW allocation is always WWEF1 and Pareto
optimal.
Proof. Let A be a MWNW allocation, with Nmax being the subset of agents having
strictly positive realized valuations under A. If it were not PO, there would
exist an allocation Aˆ such that vi(Aˆi) > vi(Ai) for some i ∈ N and vj(Aˆj) ≥
vj(Aj) for every j ∈ N\{i}. If i ∈ N\Nmax, we would have vj(Aˆj) > 0 for
every j ∈ Nmax ∪ {i}, which contradicts the assumption that Nmax is a largest
subset of agents to which it is possible to give positive valuations simultaneously.
If i ∈ Nmax, then
∏
j∈Nmax
vj(Aˆj)
wj >
∏
j∈Nmax
vj(Aj)
wj , which violates the
optimality of the right-hand side. This proves that A is PO.
As in Caragiannis et al. [2016], we will start by proving that A is WWEF1 for
the scenario Nmax = N and then address the case Nmax 6= N . Assume that
Nmax = N . If A is not WWEF1, then there exists a pair of agents i, j ∈ N such
that i has weak weighted envy towards j up to more than one item. Clearly,
there must be at least two items in j’s bundle that i values positively. Moreover,
j must value these items positively as well—otherwise we can transfer them to
i and obtain a Pareto improvement.
Let Aij , {o ∈ Aj : vi(o) > 0}. We construct another allocation A
′ by
transferring an item o∗ from j to i so that A′i = Ai ∪ {o
∗}, A′j = Aj\{o
∗}, and
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A′r = Ar ∀r ∈ N\{i, j}. We have
WNW(A′)
WNW(A)
=
(
vi(Ai ∪ {o∗})
vi(Ai)
)wi (vj(Aj\{o∗})
vj(Aj)
)wj
=
(
vi(Ai) + vi(o
∗)
vi(Ai)
)wi (vj(Aj)− vj(o∗)
vj(Aj)
)wj
=
(
1 +
vi(o
∗)
vi(Ai)
)wi (
1−
vj(o
∗)
vj(Aj)
)wj
.
First, note that vj(o) > 0, ∀o ∈ Aij , otherwise the above ratio for o
∗ with
vj(o
∗) = 0 equals
(
1 + vi(o
∗)
vi(Ai)
)wi
> 1, contradicting the assumption that A is a
MWNW allocation. However, even under this condition, we will show that if agents
i, j violated the WWEF1 property, the above ratio would still exceed 1 for some
item o∗.
Case I wi ≥ wj . Let us pick an item o∗ ∈ argmino∈Ai
j
vj(o)
vi(o)
specifically to
transfer from i to j for changing the allocation from A to A′. This is well-defined
by the definition of Aij . Consider[
WNW(A′)
WNW(A)
] 1
wj
=
(
1 +
vi(o
∗)
vi(Ai)
)wi
wj
(
1−
vj(o
∗)
vj(Aj)
)
where 1− vj(o
∗)
vj(Aj)
> 0 since vj(Aj) > vj(o
∗) ≥ 0, and
(
1 +
vi(o
∗)
vi(Ai)
)wi
wj
≥
(
1 +
wi
wj
·
vi(o
∗)
vi(Ai)
)
from Bernoulli’s inequality, since vi(o
∗)
vi(Ai)
> 0 and wi
wj
≥ 1. As in Caragiannis et al.
[2016], simple algebra shows that(
1 +
wi
wj
·
vi(o
∗)
vi(Ai)
)(
1−
vj(o
∗)
vj(Aj)
)
> 1
⇔
vi(Ai)
wi
<
vi(o
∗)
vj(o∗)
(
vj(Aj)− vj(o∗)
wj
)
. (5)
This is true under our assumptions for the following reasons. Since the “bigger”
agent i has weak weighted envy towards the “smaller” agent j up to more than
one item, vi(Ai)
wi
<
vi(Aj)−vi(o
∗)
wj
; due to our choice of o∗,
vj(o
∗)
vi(o∗)
≤
∑
o∈Aij
vj(o)∑
o∈Ai
j
vi(o)
≤
∑
o∈Aj
vj(o)∑
o∈Aj
vi(o)
=
vj(Aj)
vi(Aj)
,
since
∑
o∈Aj\Aij
vj(o) ≥ 0 and
∑
o∈Aj\Aij
vi(o) = 0. Plugging vi(Aj) ≤
vi(o
∗)
vj(o∗)
vj(Aj)
into the above strict inequality and simplifying, we obtain (5). But chaining all
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these inequalities together, we get[
WNW(A′)
WNW(A)
] 1
wj
> 1 ⇒ WNW(A′) > WNW(A).
This is a contradiction.
Case II wi < wj . As in Case I, we pick an item o
∗ ∈ argmino∈Ai
j
vj(o)
vi(o)
; this
also means that o∗ ∈ argmaxo∈Ai
j
vi(o)
vj(o)
. Consider
[
WNW(A′)
WNW(A)
] 1
wi
=
(
1 +
vi(o
∗)
vi(Ai)
)(
1−
vj(o
∗)
vj(Aj)
)wj
wi
.
Here, 1 + vi(o
∗)
vi(Ai)
> 0 obviously, and
(
1−
vj(o
∗)
vj(Aj)
)wj
wi
≥
(
1−
wj
wi
·
vj(o
∗)
vj(Aj)
)
from Bernoulli’s inequality, since
wj
wi
> 1 and 0 <
vj(o
∗)
vj(Aj)
≤ 1. Similarly to Case
I, it is straightforward to show that(
1 +
vi(o
∗)
vi(Ai)
)(
1−
wj
wi
·
vj(o
∗)
vj(Aj)
)
> 1
⇔
vi(Ai) + vi(o
∗)
wi
<
vi(o
∗)
vj(o∗)
·
vj(Aj)
wj
. (6)
Since the smaller agent i has weak weighted envy towards the bigger agent j up
to more than one item, vi(Ai)+vi(o
∗)
wi
<
vi(Aj)
wj
; also, due to our choice of o∗,
vi(o
∗)
vj(o∗)
≥
∑
o∈Ai
j
vi(o)∑
o∈Ai
j
vj(o)
≥
∑
o∈Aj
vi(o)∑
o∈Aj
vj(o)
=
vi(Aj)
vj(Aj)
,
since
∑
o∈Aj\Aij
vj(o) ≥ 0 and
∑
o∈Aj\Aij
vi(o) = 0. Plugging vi(Aj) ≤
vi(o
∗)
vj(o∗)
·
vj(Aj) into the above strict inequality, we verify (6), and chaining all inequalities
as before leads us to the same contradiction: WNW(A′) > WNW(A).
This completes the proof for the scenario Nmax = N . The rest of the proof
mirrors the corresponding part of the proof of Caragiannis et al. [2016]’s The-
orem 3.2. If Nmax ( N , it is easy to see that there can be no (weighted) envy
towards any i 6∈ Nmax since vj(Ai) = 0 for any such i and every j ∈ N . Also, for
any i, j ∈ Nmax, we can show exactly as in the proof for Nmax = N above that
there cannot be weighted envy up to more than one item. Suppose for contradic-
tion that an agent i ∈ N\Nmax is not (weakly) weighted envy-free towards some
j ∈ Nmax up to one item under A. This means that i still has positive value for
j’s bundle even after removing any single item; in particular, i values at least
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two items in Aj positively. Since j must also value these items positively, we
may transfer one of them to i and keep both i and j’s valuations positive. This
contradicts the maximality of Nmax. Hence, in all cases, i ∈ N\Nmax must be
weakly weighted envy-free up to one item towards j ∈ Nmax.
We now show that the MWNW allocation may fail to be WEF1. In fact, we show
the stronger statement that for any fixed c, the allocation may fail to be WEFc.
Proposition 4.2. Let c be an arbitrary positive integer. There exists a problem
instance with two agents having identical additive valuations for which the MWNW
allocation is not WEFc.
Proof. Suppose, N = [2], O = {o1, o2, . . . , ok+c+2}; the weights are w1 = 1 and
w2 = k for some integer k such that (1 +
1
k+c )
k > 2 (such a k exists because
limk→∞(1 +
1
k+c )
k = e); the agents have identical, additive valuations defined
by vi(o) = 1, ∀i ∈ N , ∀o ∈ O. Since (1 +
1
k+c )
k > 2, we have 1 · (k + c+ 1)k >
2 · (k+ c)k. Moreover, for 2 ≤ i ≤ k+ c, we have (1+ 1
k+c+1−i )
k > (1+ 1
k+c )
k >
2 > i+1
i
, and so i(k + c + 2 − i)k > (i + 1)(k + c + 1 − i)k. This means
that any MWNW allocation A must give one item to agent 1, say A1 = {o1},
and the remaining items to agent 2, i.e., A2 = {o2, . . . , ok+c+2}. However,
even if we remove a set Sc of at most c items from A2, we would still have
v1(A2\Sc)/w2 ≥ 1 + 1/k > 1 = v1(A1)/w1, so the allocation is not WEFc.
5 Beyond additivity
We conclude the paper with a discussion on the difficulty of extending weighted
envy concepts beyond additive valuations. First, we show that even for simple
non-additive valuations, the existence of a WEF1 or WWEF1 allocation can no
longer be guaranteed.
Proposition 5.1. Even if n = 2, one of the agents has a submodular, mono-
tone, normalized valuation, while the other agent has an additive valuation, a
complete WWEF1 allocation (or a complete WEF1 allocation) may not exist.
Proof. Suppose N = [2]; w1 = 1 and w2 = 2; m > 5; the valuation functions
are: v1(S) = |S| and v2(S) = 1 for every S ∈ 2O\∅, v1(∅) = v2(∅) = 0. The
functions are obviously normalized and monotone; v2(·) is additive and v2(·) is
submodular (agent 2 is indifferent among all non-empty bundles). Note that
for any allocated bundles A1 and A2 such that |A1| ≥ 2 and A2 is non-empty,
v2(A2)/w2 = 1/2 but v2(A1\{o})/w1 = 1 > v2(A2)/w2 for every o ∈ A1, and
v2(A2 ∪ {o})/w2 = 1/2 < v2(A1)/w1 for every o ∈ A1. Thus, the only way
to make agent 2 (weakly) weighted envy-free up to one item towards agent 1
is to ensure that |A1| ≤ 1. Assume without loss of generality that A1 = {o1}
(if A1 = ∅, agent 1 will be even worse off in the argument that follows). To
make the allocation complete, we must have A2 = O\{o1}, so that v1(A1) = 1
and v1(A2) = |A2| = m − 1. Since agent 1 has an additive valuation and a
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smaller weight than agent 2, she would be weakly weighted envy-free up to
one item towards agent 2 if and only if there is an item o ∈ A2 such that
v1(A1 ∪ {o})/w1 ≥ v1(A2)/w2 = (m − 1)/2 > 2, since m > 5. However, for
any o ∈ A2, we have v1(A1 ∪ {o})/w1 = v1({o1, o}) = 2. Hence the allocation
cannot be WWEF1.
One of the key ideas in the proof of Theorem 4.1 is what we can call the
transferability property: if agent i has (weighted) envy towards agent j under
additive valuations, then there is at least one item o in j’s bundle for which
agent i has positive (marginal) utility, i.e., the item o could be transferred from
j to i to augment i’s realized valuation. Unfortunately, this property no longer
holds for non-additive valuations.
Proposition 5.2. Even if an agent i with a non-additive valuation function
has weighted envy towards agent j under allocation A, there may be no item in
j’s bundle for which i has positive marginal utility, i.e., 6 ∃o ∈ Aj s.t. vi(Ai ∪
{o})− vi(Ai) > 0.
Proof. Consider the example in Proposition 5.1. Under any allocation with
|A1| = m − 1 and |A2| = 1, agent 2 has weighted envy towards agent 1 since
v2(A2) = 1/2 < 1 = v2(A1)/w1; but v2(A2 ∪ {o}) = 1 = v2(A2) for every
o ∈ A1.
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